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BRIEF OF APPELLANT WALTER W. KERSHAW
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff claims specific performance under an alleged
option agreement executed by this appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant Kershaw was the original sole defendant
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(R. 1-13). By his second amended complaint (R. 49-52)
plaintiff interjected appellants Willard B. Rogers, Edward B. Rogers and Rockefeller Land and Livestock
Company, a corporation, as parties defendant, hereinafter
sometimes collectively called "Rogers", demanding judgment to the effect that any interest claimed by them be
declared inferior and subject to the claimed prior interest
of the plaintiff in the subject real property. Appellant
Kershaw's answer and counterclaim (R. 28-32) was
adopted by stipulation as his answer to those portions
of the second amended complaint which pertained to him
(R. 53).
Subsequently the Rogers filed an answer and counterclaim asserting title in their favor and demanding that
their title be quieted against the claims of plaintiff (R.
65). Thereafter the Rogers filed a cross-claim against
appellant Kershaw on the theory of breach of warranty
and named Helen G. Kershaw as a party defendant (R.
68). The Kershaws, husband and wife, filed their answer
(R. 73-75) to the cross-claim of the Rogers denying the
connotation of a warranty and alleging, among other
things, that any conveyance to them was by quit-claim
with the knowledge on the part of the Rogers that the
Kershaws were conveying no more of an interest than
they had both in fact and in law and that the Rogers
knew or should have known of adverse claims.
A jury was impaneled at the request of the Rogers.
Upon motion of appellant Kershaw, joined in by the
plaintiff, the jury was discharged over the objection of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Rogers. The trial court documented the grounds for
the discharge of the jury in its findings of fact (R. 222223).
The judgment and order, likewise prepared by the
trial court, contains the same recitals with reference to
the discharge of the jury (R. 231-233). The option relied
upon by plaintiff was held to be a viable instrument in
his hands and appellant Kershaw was required by the
judgment to deliver to plaintiff "a general warranty deed"
to the subject property upon payment of "the amount
set forth in the agreement." After the date on which the
conveyance is required to be made under paragraph 1 of
the judgment and order, the Rogers and all persons claiming under them will be enjoined and debarred from claiming or asserting any estate or claim with respect to the
subject property or any part thereof (R. 233). The
counterclaim of the Rogers against the plaintiff was dismissed and likewise the cross-claim of the Rogers against
this appellant and his wife, Helen G. Kershaw. Plaintiff
was awarded court costs in the amount of $119.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000.00 against this
appellant.
The judgment and order referred to above was preceded by a memorandum decision (R. 136-142) which,
among other things, directed the plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment with an
opportunity given to this appellant and to others to make
timely objections to the plaintiff's proposals. The documentation as proposed by the plaintiff (R. 200b-209)
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was objected to by this appellant (R. 210-219) and the
subject of a written order (R. 220-221) which order immediately preceded the documentation of the final judgment and order by the trial judge. The latter documents,
including the findings of fact, are at variance in some
respects with the memorandum decision. The trial judge
omitted some of the factual comments previously stated
in its memorandum.
The judgment and supporting documents as documented by the trial judge were challenged by this appellant by his motion for new trial and for other or alternative relief (R. 237-239), and, after oral argument, were
overruled and denied (R. 248). This appeal followed (R.
257-258).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Kershaw respectfully urges that the alleged
option was not a viable instrument in the hands of plaintiff; that the judgment appealed from is erroneous in directing the execution of a general warranty deed; that
there was no proper tender by the plaintiff; no basis for
the award of attorney's fees and that for those and other
reasons to be hereafter urged the judgment in favor of
the plaintiff against this appellant should be reversed in
its entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Milton Christensen, named as the buyer in the option agreement, Exhibit P-4, was purchasing the Kimball
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Ranch consisting of some 985 acres from appellant Kershaw for a price of approximately $135,000.00 under a
contract of sale (Rep. tr. 138-141). The Prudential Life
Insurance Company had a mortgage of $100,000.00 on
the Kimball Ranch upon which appellant Kershaw was
the maker (Rep. tr. 152). The properties described in
the option are adjacent to the Kimball property (Exhibit
P-l).
Parcel No. 1, the 480 acres described in the option
agreement, was the subject of negotiations in 1969 between Marion Kesler, a witness for the plaintiff, and
Christensen, likewise a witness for the plaintiff. Mr.
Christensen acted as agent for Mr. Kershaw in the negotiations (Rep. tr. 143-146). The 480 acres is included
within the Staples escrow agreement, Exhibit P-2. Bradshaw was aware of the escrow agreement (Rep. tr. 206207) and that the 480 acres could not be severed until
the payout under the escrow and that in addition,
$7,200.00 remained to be paid to Kesler (Rep. tr. 208).
Christensen filed for bankruptcy in May, 1970, and
had not been discharged as of the time of the assignment
of the option to plaintiff Bradshaw. Appellant Kershaw
was listed as a creditor of Christensen to the extent of
approximately $40,000.00 (Rep. tr. 554) on matters pertaining to the Kimball Ranch (Rep. tr. 152).
Christensen testified to having met with Mr. Kershaw during the forepart of August, 1970, in the latter's
home in Salt Lake City, at which time the payment to
Kesler of $7,200.00 in connection with Parcel No. 1, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the payment to Mrs. Grace Staples of $2,850.00, in connection with Parcel No. 2 in the option were discussed
along with refinancing the purchase of the Kimball farm
in connection with which there was an arrearage not only
to Mr. Kershaw, but also to Prudential Life Insurance
Company. Christensen equated this conversation with
the signing of the option agreement, Exhibit P-4. Christensen testified that Mr. Kershaw was desirous of liquidating all of his interests in Millard County and to make
arrangements for Christensen to take over the Kimball
farm, the 480 acre tract and the 80 acre tract (Rep. tr.
151-154).
Mr. Kershaw testified that Exhibit P-4 was but a
blank form when signed by him (Rep. tr. 531). An arrangement had been worked out by Mr. Kershaw, Mr.
Christensen, and Prudential Life Insurance Company
whereby Christensen would have until 12:00 noon on
November 15, 1970, to refinance the purchase of the Kimball Ranch. Mr. Kershaw was attempting to do everything
he could to assist Christensen in those particulars (Rep.
tr. 539).
Exhibit P-4 was signed by Mr. Kershaw on July 20,
1970 Mr. Christensen representing that the document was
necessary in support of a loan application to Farmers
Home Administration (Rep, tr. 510). The trial court
found, contrary to Mr. Kershaw's testimony, that the form
had been completed as to its typewritten portions prior to
Mr. Kershaw's signature. Mr. Kershaw's intent, neverDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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theless, was consistent with the testimony of Christensen
as indicated above.
Christensen on August 5, 1970, presented the option
agreement with a farm and home plan to the office of
Farmers Home Administration in Millard County (Rep.
tr. 345-346). The applicattion was denied on September
15, 1970, after review by the agency's county committee
(Rep. tr. 348-351). The form, Exhibit P-4, is a standard
form prepared by the government agency, printed by the
agency, and furnished to all loan applicants (Rep. tr. 345).
On December 1, 1970, Mr. Kershaw received a communication from attorney Weston Bayles to the effect
that Christensen was claiming the option agreement as
a viable document. The communication resulted in immediate repercussion, including a meeting in Mr. Bayles'
office with Christensen, Bradshaw, Rogers and Kershaw.
Mr. Kershaw verbally repudiated the option (Rep. tr.
515-517) and advised everyone that he was selling or had
sold whatever property interests he had in properties in
Millard County to the Rogers (Rep. tr. 515). Christensen testified that he was threatened with physical violence by Kershaw at the meeting in the attorney's office
and that considerable ill feeling existed. Christensen recorded the option agreement December 23, 1970.
On January 8, 1971, appellant Kershaw was advised
by letter, Exhibit 7, that Bradshaw was the owner of the
option and that upon the execution of a warranty deed
signed by Walter W. Kershaw and Dorothy W. Kershaw
and delivering the same to the escrow holder, Kershaw
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would be paid the sum of $9,950.00 (R. 12). Christensen
had assigned the option agreement to Bradshaw for a
consideration of $5,000.00, $500.00 of which was paid to
Christensen on the 8th day of January and the remaining $4,500.00 was to be paid, conditioned upon the successful outcome of the litigation that had been anticipated
by Mr. Kershaw's previous repudation of the option
agreement.
The record does not disclose the marital status of
Mr. Kershaw at the time of the option agreement or as
of the date of the alleged tender which was coupled with
the demand that the warranty deed be signed by both
Walter W. Kershaw and Dorothy W. Kershaw. No judgment was entered as against Helen G. Kershaw, the wife
of Walter W. Kershaw. The requirement of the signature
of Dorothy W. Kershaw on a warranty deed as a condition precedent to the payment of the money held in escrow was one of the several issues presented to the trial
court and ruled upon adversely to this appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE O P T I O N AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT
P-4) WAS A ONE PURPOSE DOCUMENT
AND HAD NO VITALITY AFTER THE
LOAN APPLICATION WAS REJECTED.
In the interpretation of a contract, the universal rule
requires the court to determine what the parties intended
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
by what they said. "The court may not add, ignore or
discard words in the process * * *." Cornwall vs.
Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P. 2d
928 (1962). In Basler vs. Warren, 159 F. 2d 41 (1947),
the 10th Cir., applying Utah law to the construction of a
contract, asserted as a universal cannon of construction
that every word and phrase in a contract should be given
a meaning and signification according to its importance
in the context of the contract, and stated:
"Courts are not warranted in reading out of a
contract words or phrases placed there by the
contracting party unless they cannot be rationally fitted into the scheme of agreement between the parties."
The rule that the court may not add, ignore or discard words in the process of interpretation is the holding
in Vulcan Steel Corporation vs. Markosian, 23 Utah 2d
287,462 P. 2d 166 (1969).
Within the concept of the foregoing is that portion
of Paragraph No. 2 of the option agreement, Exhibit P-4,
which reads as follows:
"2. This option is given to enable the Buyer
to obtain a loan insured or made by the United
States of America, acting through the Farmers Home Administration, United States Department of Agriculture and its duly authorized representatives, (hereinafter called the
'Government'), for the purchase of said property. I t is agreed that the Buyer's efforts to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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obtain a loan constitute a part of the consideration for this option."
The application for the loan was made by Christensen and was rejected by Farmers Home Administration
on or prior to September 15, 1970. The rejection of the
loan frustrated and terminated the entire contract.
POINT II.
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE RELATED SOLELY TO PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND WERE ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF.
Finding No. 12 (R. 228) includes, among other things,
"* * * the parties stipulated that $2,000.00 is a reasonable fee for the work performed by counsel for and in
behalf of the Plaintiff * * *." There is nothing in
the written record with reference to the amount of attorney's fees or the stipulation specified by the trial court.
Although the record is silent on the subject, this
appellant concedes that it was stipulated that if counsel
for the plaintiff was duly sworn and examined that he
would testify that $2,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's
fee. The amount was not challenged but the stipulation
reserved the legal issue as to whether plaintiff under the
terms of the option, Exhibit P-4, was entitled to recover
attorney's fees from this appellant. The issue thus presented is related to the matters discussed under POINT
I above.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Paragraph No. 4 of Exhibit P-4 reads as follows:
"4. The Seller agrees to pay all expenses of
title clearance including, if required, abstract
or certificate of title or policy of title insurance, continued down to the date of acceptance of this option and thereafter continued
down to and including date of recordation of
the deed from the Seller to the Buyer, costs
of survey, if required, and attorney's fees; and
the Seller agrees that, except as herein provided, all taxes, liens, encumbrances or other
interests in third persons will be satisfied, discharged, or paid by him including stamp taxes
and other expenses incident to the preparation
and execution of the deed and other evidences
of title. Title evidences will he obtained from
persons and be in such form as the Government shall approve" (Emphasis added)
The expressed purpose of the option being that of
enabling the buyer to obtain a loan insured or made by
the government through FHA, the provision with respect
to attorney's fees can apply only to the efforts of the
government with respect to "title clearance" for the purpose of the option. The language with respect to attorney's fees must be measured within the context of the
expressed purpose of the option.
In the recent case of Humphries vs. Remco, Inc., 30
Utah 2d 348, 517 P. 2d 1309 (1974), this Court reaffirmed
the long recognized rule that attorney's fees are not
awarded in the absence of statute or express agreement
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of the parties except perhaps in punitive damage actions.
There is no contractual commitment in the option agreement, viewed in light of its purpose, that plaintiff can
avail himself of with reference to attorney's fees and the
trial court erred in that respect.
POINT III.
THE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF.
Contrary to what is said in POINT I above, there
are courts that hold that the language relating to the
expressed purpose of the parties can be ignored and that
specific performance of an option can be required even
though the loan application is denied and the expressed
purpose of the document thus frustrated. Perhaps it may
be said that like "-beauty" words that might be conceived
to have logical and normal import are measured only in
"the eye of the beholder".
Specific performance of a contract for the sale of
real property as affected by a provision making it conditional upon the purchaser obtaining a loan is the subject
of a fairly extensive annotation in 5 A. L. R. 2d 287. The
annotator by way of an introductory statement calls attention to the vagaries of judicial expressions and after
pointing to the concept that courts have considered themselves definitely bound by general principles of specific
performance law relating to mutuality, certainty, and definiteness states by way of summary a concept that gives
concern to all. The summary states in part as follows:
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" * * * a broad survey of the cases coming
within the scope of the annotation results in
the conclusions that a court, having made up
its mind as to the party with whom the general
equities as to the allowance or refusal of specific performance of the contract in suit lie,
may, by the exercise of a little ingenuity, find
adequate precedents among the prior decisions
involving specific performance law generally,
to support whatever decision it wants to make
in the particular case before it as to the effect
upon the right to specific performance of the
appearance in the contract of a stipulation
making the sale contingent upon the purchaser's procuring a loan." (Emphasis added)
The -annotation mentioned above is supplemented in
A. L. JR. 2d, Later Case Service, Page 606. In both annotations there are cases dealing with printed forms furnished by government agencies, including FHA. There
are cases in the annotation that support the one purpose
concept and others that are contrary to that position.
On the other hand, there are courts that have resolved
the apparent inequities of the situation by resorting to
the concept of lack of mutuality. In the instant case
Exhibit P-4 in its printed form, as furnished by the government agency, provides in Paragraph No. 10 the following:
"10. The Seller agrees that, irrespective of
any other provision in this option, the Buyer,
or his assignees, may, if the option is accepted,
without any liability therefor refuse to accept
conveyance of the property described herein
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if the foresaid loan cannot be made or insured
because of defects in the title to other land now
owned by, or being purchased by, the buyer/'
(Emphasis added)
The provision of the option, as last above quoted,
gives the buyer an advantage not enjoyed by the seller.
The seller's property remains subjected to the option
and during the term thereof, he is restricted from disposing of the property and the buyer is under no obligation
to purchase if the loan application is denied by reason
of defects in title to land peculiar to the buyer and concerning which the seller has no interest and under which
he has no control.
That the contract is incomplete, indefinite, and inequitable as to substantial and material matters appears
to us to be obvious. The Utah case law to the effect that
such a contract will not be specifically enforced is summarized in D. H. Overmyer Co. vs. Brown, 439 F. 2d 926,
10th Cir., (1971). This case cites Bunnell vs. Bills, 13
Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (1962); Pitcher vs. Lauritzen,
18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d 491 (1967); Vulcarce vs. Bitters,
12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 427 (1961). As to the latter case
this Court is held to have stated:
" * * * that the courts cannot 'fabricate' the
kind of a contract the parties ought to have
made and then enforce it."
As to the Pitcher case, the 10th Cir. attributes to
this court that specific performance cannot be required
unless "all terms of the agreement are clear."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Tested by the rule of clarity Parcel No. 1 as set forth
in the option agreement concludes with the words "Price
$7,200.00". Parcel No. 2 concludes with the words "Balance $2,850.00". What do these words mean? As to Parcel No. 2, the expression "Contractual agreement" between Grace W. Staples and this appellant was construed
by plaintiff's witness Christensen to mean "contractural
arrangement" (Rep. tr. 299). Christensen, the scrivener
of all typewritten portions, construed the words as requiring him to pay the balance of $2,850.00 to Mrs. Grace W.
Staples (Rep. tr. 298).
The meaning of the price of $7,200.00 appearing at
the end of Parcel No. 1 is equally vague and uncertain.
The record shows that the real property specifically described under Parcel No. 1 was a part of an escrow arrangement involving other property and property interests and that the 480 acres could not be severed until the
Staples escrow had been paid and discharged. This involved the payment of some $20,000.00 to $25,000.00 at
the time of the option agreement. Bradshaw was aware
of these facts (Rep. tr. 208). Bradshaw was aware of the
agreements with Mrs. Staples and that appellant Kershaw did not have title to the real property specifically
described in Parcel No. 2 (Rep. tr. 279). This court in
the case of Intermountain Farmers Assoc, vs. Peart, 30
Utah 2d 201, 515 P. 2d 614 (1973), held that where both
the buyer and seller knew that the seller did not have
title, the mutual mistake of fact precluded specific performance. To the same effect is Roy S. Ludlow Invest-
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merit Co. vs. Taggart, 29 Utah 2d 349, 509 P. 2d 818
(1973).
Bradshaw knew that there was no existing well permit on the 480 acre tract. Christensen had intended to
move an existing well permit from the Kimball Ranch
to the 480 acre tract but never got around to doing it
(Rep. tr. 254-255). Bradshaw was aware of the Staples
escrow agreement and the conditions precedent before
the 480 acre tract could be isolated.
The uncertainties and ambiguities stated above were
a calculated risk on the part of Bradshaw when he paid
Christensen $500.00 on January 8, 1971, leaving the remaining payment of $4,500.00 contingent upon his succeeding in this lawsuit (Rep. tr. 413-414). This alone
makes the transaction suspect and gives rise to the equitable principle that one coming into a court of equity must
come with "clean hands". The uncertainties and ambiguities on the face of the option agreement preclude
plaintiff's recovery on the theory of specific performance
and all of the surrounding circumstances show that in
equity and good conscience he should be precluded from
the relief of specific performance.
POINT IV.
THE ALLEGED TENDER AND THE DECREE REQUIRING PERFORMANCE BY
THIS DEFENDANT ARE FATALLY DEFECTIVE.
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The judgment and order of the trial court (R. 231233) does not specify the amount of money that this
appellant is to receive upon delivery of the conveyance
ordered by the court. Paragraph No. 2 is to the effect
that upon delivery of the conveyance the plaintiff pay
"the amount set forth in the agreement". In 71 Am. JUT.
2d, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, Section 221, it is
stated in part:
" I n awarding specific performance of a land
contract, the decree should set out a description of the property to be conveyed and the
price to be paid, rather than referring for those
matters to the petition and the contract."
The letter of January 8, 1971, relied upon by plaintiff as his tender of performance required a warranty deed
executed by Walter W. Kershaw and by Dorothy W. Kershaw. Dorothy W. Kershaw is a stranger to the record
and to these proceedings. The requirement of the deed
with the two signatures as indicated was never modified
or diluted.
There has been no performance or tender of performance on plaintiff's part. By insisting upon the signature
of Dorothy W. Kershaw with instructions to the escrow
holder not to pay the money to this appellant without
receiving a deed with the signature of Dorothy W. Kershaw, plaintiff does not even come close to the threshhold
of a court of equity on the premise of specific performance.
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CONCLUSION
Milton A. Christensen for the relatively insignificant
sum of $500.00 betrayed the relationship of trust and confidence with appellant Kershaw and his transaction with
Bradshaw was tainted within the connotation of Holland
vs. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 989 (1960). It is
unnecssary to belabor this point or to suggest there is
anything that can be remedied by remanding the case
to the lower court for further proceeding.
Under plaintiff's theory of the option agreement, a
form concocted by a government agency, the same expired by its terms on August 8,1971, and at no time prior
to the expiration date did plaintiff tender performance
on his part unrestricted by the unilateral requirement of
the signature of Dorothy W. Kershaw on the requested
deed, a requirement that was neither contracted for nor
a condition that could be met.
The judgment and decree against this appellant
should be reversed and as to him the action should be
dismissed with costs.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN & GUSTIN
By Harley W. Gustin
Paul H. Liapis
r

„it

Attorneys for Appellant
Walter W. Kershaw
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